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Abstract
N-Variant Execution (NVX) systems utilize software diver-
sity techniques for enhancing software security. The general
idea is to run multiple different variants of the same program
alongside each other while monitoring their run-time behavior.
If the internal disparity between the running variants causes
observable differences in response to malicious inputs, the
monitor can detect such divergences in execution and then
raise an alert and/or terminate execution.
Existing NVX systems execute multiple, artificially diver-
sified program variants on a single host. This paper presents a
novel, distributed NVX design that executes program variants
across multiple heterogeneous host computers; our prototype
implementation combines an x86-64 host with an ARMv8
host. Our approach greatly increases the level of “internal
different-ness” between the simultaneously running variants
that can be supported, encompassing different instruction sets,
endianness, calling conventions, system call interfaces, and
potentially also differences in hardware security features.
A major challenge to building such a heterogeneous dis-
tributed NVX system is performance. We present solutions to
some of the main performance challenges. We evaluate our
prototype system implementing these ideas to show that it can
provide reasonable performance on a wide range of realistic
workloads.
1 Introduction
Memory errors have been a continuous source of software
vulnerabilities for C and C++ programs. Attackers and defend-
ers are engaged in an arms race in which the former keep
developing increasingly sophisticated defenses while their
adversaries keep crafting novel exploits that bypass these
defenses [60]. At present, adversaries rely on intimate knowl-
edge of the target environment (such as details about the
victim application, the target operating system, the instruction
set architecture of the host, and runtime parameters such as
memory addresses) to mount code-reuse [9, 56, 58] or data-
oriented attacks [11, 34, 35] that allow them to take control
of the target and/or leak its sensitive data. While memory
safety techniques can provide strong protections against these
threats, many of these techniques have not seen widespread
deployment due to performance [47, 48] and compatibility
problems [59].
Instead, defenders resort to mitigation techniques that have
a more reasonable performance impact, e.g., control-flow
integrity (CFI) techniques [1, 7], automated software diver-
sity techniques [42], or a combination thereof. Both of these
classes of defenses have a history of known weaknesses. CFI
techniques often leave sufficient leeway to mount attacks on
all but the most trivial applications [8,13,15,19,21,24,25,62],
and software diversity techniques have been bypassed using
brute-forcing and information leakage attacks, including at-
tacks enabled by micro-architectural side channels [3, 5, 13,
18, 20, 22, 26, 29, 30, 36, 38, 43, 49, 57, 58].
N-Variant eXecution (NVX) systems amplify the effec-
tiveness of software diversity techniques and increase re-
silience [4, 6, 14, 32, 33, 39–41, 45, 46, 53, 65, 67–70]. An
NVX system runs multiple diversified variants of the same
program in parallel on the same inputs while monitoring the
variants’ behavior for divergences. With the right selection
of diversity techniques, NVX can make successful exploita-
tion substantially harder (and, in some cases, even provably
impossible) as it forces adversaries to simultaneously compro-
mise multiple program variants without causing observable
changes in their behavior.
Existing NVX systems have been particularly effective
at stopping attacks that rely on knowledge of the target’s
absolute virtual address space layout (i.e., code-reuse ex-
ploits whose payloads include absolute pointer values) [6,
14, 67], as well as attacks that attempt to acquire that knowl-
edge (i.e., information leakage attacks) [45]. However, these
systems are not resilient to Position-Independent Return-
Oriented Programming (PIROP) attacks [27] and certain Data-
Oriented Programming (DOP) attacks [35], which build on
knowledge of the program’s internal geometry (e.g., relative
data/instruction layouts) and/or data representation. The main
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reason is that in previous NVX systems all the variants run on
the same machine as shown in Figure 1(a). Thus, the amount
of diversity that such systems can achieve is limited to what a
single platform can offer. On the other hand, binaries targeted
at multiple different platforms have an inherent diversity that
comes naturally from differences in calling conventions, in-
struction set architectures, endianness, system call interfaces
and available hardware features.
In this paper, we present DMON, an NVX system that al-
lows us to leverage the diversity that naturally exists across
different platforms, thereby increasing resilience to memory
exploits. DMON compiles and runs each program variant on
its own dedicated machine and monitors divergent behavior
between these distributed variants by cross-checking them
at the system call boundary via a network. Figure 1(b) illus-
trates our design. To bypass DMON, adversaries would need
to develop exploits that work simultaneously against the two
(or more) different ISAs and ABIs that the program variants
are compiled for. DMON runs on commodity hardware with
regular multi-core CPUs. As our evaluation shows, DMON’s
overhead can be further reduced by optionally adding spe-
cialized network interface cards with Remote Direct Memory
Access (RDMA) support.
Our contributions are as follows:
• We present DMON, the first system that combines
ISA and ABI heterogeneity with N-Variant Execution.
DMON distributes the execution of a set of variants over
a heterogeneous set of physical machines. DMON pro-
vides a natural resilience against memory exploits as
it forces adversaries to develop exploits that work si-
multaneously against multiple ISAs, ABIs, system call
interfaces, and available hardware features.
• We study and identify several performance bottlenecks
and cross-checking issues that are unique to the dis-
tributed and heterogeneous monitoring setting and
present strategies to alleviate these issues.
• We evaluate DMON’s security on several realistic server
applications and show that DMON makes successful
code-reuse and data-only attacks substantially more dif-
ficult.
• We evaluate the performance of DMON on a wide
set of microbenchmarks and server applications, con-
duct a thorough security analysis on several sets of
ISA/ABI-heterogeneous program variants, and conclude
that DMON offers strong protections at reasonable cost.
2 Background
Researchers in the information security [4,6,14,40,45,53,65,
67–70] and software reliability communities [32,33,39,41,46,
51] have presented over a dozen different NVX systems since
Kernel
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Figure 1: Two NVX designs running two variants.
2006. Although these systems serve a variety of different
purposes, they do have some essential similarities. First, all
systems have the same high-level architecture; two or more
software variants execute simultaneously on the same phys-
ical machine, while a monitoring component (on that same
machine) compares the variants’ overall behavior, provides
them with identical inputs, and demultiplexes their outputs.
Most monitors perform these tasks by forcing the variants to
execute in lock-step at the granularity of system calls. This
means that the variants will be suspended at every system call
entry and exit, and they will not be allowed to proceed until
the monitor has cross-checked (i.e., compared across variants)
the system call numbers and arguments.
Second, all existing NVX systems cross-check behavior
and replicate I/O by intercepting the variants’ system calls.
Most early systems used a dedicated monitoring process that
attaches to the variants and intercepts their system calls using
the ptrace API [6, 32, 46, 53, 68]. To avoid the high run-time
performance overhead incurred by context switching between
a variant process and the monitor process, several teams ex-
plored alternative designs that use binary rewriting [33], vir-
tualization features [40], or kernel modules [14, 45, 67, 69] to
intercept and cross-check system calls more efficiently, within
the variants’ processes and address spaces.
2.1 System Calls and I/O Replication
Modern operating systems isolate processes from one another
by providing them with a distinct virtual address space and
limited privileges. Processes must use system calls to inter-
act with other processes, the host system, and its hardware
resources. While the exact implementation of this system call
interface depends on the instruction set and operating system,
it generally works as follows. First, the program loads the
system call number and the system call arguments into the
appropriate processor registers or into the stack. Then, the
program executes the system call instruction defined by the
processor’s instruction set. Next, the CPU raises the current
privilege level and transfers control to the kernel’s system
call entrypoint. The kernel then reads the system call number
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and arguments and invokes the appropriate system service.
Finally, the kernel executes the system call return instruction
to lower the privilege level and to transfer control back to the
program.
NVX systems monitor behavior and replicate I/O at the
system call interface. This design lets the system monitor all
behavior that can potentially affect the integrity of the OS or
other processes, as well as all communication between the
variants and external entities1. The monitoring and replication
must be transparent to the program variants and to the end-
user. In other words, neither the variants, nor any external
observer should be able to notice any differences (apart from
timing) between native execution of a single variant and NVX
of multiple variants. To provide this guarantee, our system
designates one variant as the leader, while the others become
followers. Whenever the variants attempt an I/O operation, our
system ensures that only the leader variant actually completes
the operation, while the followers skip the operation and wait
until they receive the I/O results from the monitor.
2.2 ISA-Heterogeneity
An underlying assumption of NVX is that the program vari-
ants will behave identically if i) they are built from the same
source code, and ii) they receive equivalent benign inputs.
This assumption no longer holds in our setting, where we
run variants on processors with different ISAs. Differences
in the endianness, register, and pointer width — and even the
available system calls could lead to observable (yet benign)
differences in the variants’ behavior, which would all cause
false alarms in a traditional NVX system. We encountered
many such differences and designed DMON so it can tolerate
any expected divergences that stem from the heterogeneous-
ISA setting.
2.3 ABI-Heterogeneity
Aside from obvious differences such as different instruction
opcodes and encoding, endianness, and register/pointer width,
ISA-heterogeneous variants often also differ in more subtle
ways because the OS maintainers impose a set of conventions
for all binary programs compiled for the target ISA. The
Application Binary Interface (ABI) documents rules such as
sizes of primitive data types, how structs are packed, padded,
and aligned, how function callers can pass arguments to their
callees, etc. Many of these conventions also affect the program
behavior as observed from the system call interface, and we
therefore had to carefully design DMON so it takes the ABIs
into account when comparing variant behavior.
1Communication via shared memory is not visible at the system call
interface, so most NVX systems prevent the variants from mapping shared
memory regions.
3 Threat Model
Throughout the rest of the paper, we will make the follow-
ing assumptions about the host system and the attacker. Our
assumptions are consistent with related work in this area [67].
Host defenses We assume that the standard set of migita-
tions are in place on any of the physical machines DMON
and the variants run on. Specifically, we assume that Data
Execution Prevention (DEP) is used, and that memory pages
are therefore never writable and executable at the same time.
DEP therefore rules out code-injection attacks. Likewise, we
assume that all of the host systems have Address Space Lay-
out Randomization (ASLR) enabled. ASLR randomizes the
base addresses of the main program executable and shared
libraries, as well as the heap, stack, and any other mapped
memory regions. Note that, even with ASLR in place, the
NVX system can still override the base addresses of any re-
gion mapped into a variant’s address space [45, 65].
Known and vulnerable target We assume that the pro-
tected application is known to the attacker, and that the at-
tacker either has direct access to the variant binaries, or that
the attacker can reproduce exact replicas of any of the tar-
get binaries for offline analysis. We further assume that the
protected application has an arbitrary memory read/write vul-
nerability that the attacker knows how to trigger.
Remote attacker We assume that the attacker does not have
direct access to any of the physical machines DMON (or the
variants) run on. The attacker can only communicate with the
protected application via a remote communication channel
such as a network socket. Because the attacker is remote,
we also assume that any run-time secrets embedded into the
variants (e.g. randomized base addresses) are not known a
priori.
4 DMON Design
DMON orchestrates and supervises the execution of a set of
diversified program variants running natively on machines
that differ in their instruction set architecture. Like most other
NVX systems, DMON uses a leader/follower-model for I/O
replication. The designated leader variant is the only vari-
ant allowed to perform externally observable I/O operations
such as sending or receiving data from a network socket.
DMON forces follower variants to skip these I/O operations
and instead provides them with the leader’s I/O results, thus
emulating the original operation unbeknownst to the follower.
Similar to other security-focused NVX systems such as
ReMon [67] and MvArmor [40], DMON executes all security
sensitive system calls in lock step. Whenever the variants
attempt to execute a sensitive system call, DMON ensures
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Figure 2: DMON’s basic components and interactions.
that the variants can neither enter the system call routine,
nor exit from it until DMON has ensured that all variants
have reached equivalent states. We distinguish between the
following components of a running DMON system:
1. Leader Variant Only the designated leader variant is
allowed to perform externally observable I/O. As in any
other NVX system, DMON requires that there is ex-
actly one leader variant. The leader designation is fixed.
Leader variants cannot become followers and vice versa.
2. Follower Variants Follower variants skip externally ob-
servable I/O operations and use the leader’s I/O results
instead. DMON supports any number of such variants.
3. Monitors The monitors are responsible for starting the
variants, supervising their execution, exchanging sys-
tem call metadata (system call numbers, arguments, and
results), performing security checks, and enforcing lock-
step execution. DMON uses two types of monitors: the
(single) L-MON monitor supervises the leader variant,
while every follower variant is supervised by its own
F-MON monitor.
4. RC-COM A reliable communication component used
to exchange system call metadata between the moni-
tors. By separating the communication logic into its own
abstraction layer, we have enabled the monitors to com-
municate over a variety of communication channels (e.g.,
loopback interfaces vs network cards, different network
protocols, etc.).
These components interact whenever the variants execute
system calls, as shown in Figure 2. Whenever a leader or fol-
lower variant attempts to enter or exit from a system call ( 1 ),
the corresponding L-MON or F-MON interrupts and suspends
the variant, reads the call number of the interrupted system
call, and invokes a specialized handler routine within the mon-
itor process ( 2 ), which implements the cross-checking and
replication logic for that system call.
The monitors use cross-checking handlers when they in-
terrupt variants upon entering a system call. In F-MON, the
cross-checking handler gathers information about the vari-
ant’s state, sends this information to L-MON ( 3 ), and waits
for L-MON to confirm that the follower variant is in a state
equivalent to the leader variant ( 4 ). In L-MON, the cross-
checking handler waits for incoming state information from
F-MON, compares that state information with the leader vari-
ant’s state, and informs F-MON about the results of the com-
parison.
The state information consists of system call numbers and
arguments, with the latter often consisting of one or more
pointers to complex data structures (e.g., I/O vectors). The
cross-checking handlers serialize these corresponding data
structures and append the serialized data to the state infor-
mation, thereby allowing L-MON to check the variant states
for deep equivalence (two data structures are deeply equiva-
lent when the raw data they contain is identical, even though
the data or the data structures may be stored at different ad-
dresses). If the variant states do not match, DMON will inter-
pret that as a sign of potential compromise, and it will abort
execution to protect the host system.
Naive cross-checking of these variant states could trigger
false alarms for divergent behavior because the system call
interfaces, calling conventions, data representation, etc. may
differ across platforms. DMON’s cross-checking handler rec-
onciles such differences to avoid alarms for the expected (and
benign) divergences (see Section 4.4). For example, the same
system call may have different system call numbers in dif-
ferent platforms. To correctly handle this, DMON keeps a
mapping between these syscall numbers. The cross-checking
handler consults this mapping to recognize equivalent system
calls between variants running on different platforms.
If the states do match, the cross-checking handler allows the
leader variant to proceed and to enter the kernel-space system
call routine. The follower variants can also proceed, but may
(optionally) see their system call number replaced by that
of the sys_getpid routine in case they attempt to perform
an externally observable I/O operation. This mechanism for
skipping system calls was also used in prior work [53].
The monitors use replication handlers when they interrupt
variants that return from a system call. Replication handlers
for I/O system calls broadcast the system call results from the
leader variant to the followers. Replication handlers for other
system calls are generally no-ops.
4.1 Monitor Design
Prior work often used a central monitor process which si-
multaneously supervised all of the variants [6, 53, 68]. Sub-
sequent research showed that this centralized model was
overly focused on simplicity and security at the expense
of performance, and suggested various designs in which
each variant was supervised by a dedicated monitor in-
stance [33,40,45,67,69,70]. This dedicated monitor instance
could be loaded directly into the variants’ address spaces,
thereby sacrificing the isolation between the variants and the
monitor for greatly reduced variant-monitor communication
overhead.
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DMON combines elements of both designs. Since we run
ISA-heterogeneous variants on different physical machines,
we cannot use a single (central) monitor that attaches locally
to all variants. Instead, we use a dedicated monitor for each
variant and run the monitor on the same machine as the vari-
ant it supervises. Our design does, however, enforce strict
isolation between the variant and its monitor by running the
monitor as a separate process that attaches to the variant using
the ptrace API.
Each monitor includes an RC-COM, which exposes our
inter-monitor communication API. By separating the low-
level communication logic from the monitor, we were able to
implement and compare various communication mechanisms.
4.2 Inter-Monitor Communication
F-MON and L-MON communicate whenever the variants
execute a system call. This exchange may include system
call numbers, serialized system call arguments, system call
results, or instructions on how to proceed from a system call
entry point (see Section 4). In many cases, particularly when
the system call being executed is deemed security-sensitive,
communication must happen synchronously. For instance, L-
MON cannot allow the leader variant to proceed past a system
call entry point until all instances of F-MON have serialized
the state of their corresponding variant, and until they have
sent this state to L-MON. F-MON needs to wait even longer
as it cannot allow the follower variants to proceed until L-
MON has compared the variant states and it has received
L-MON’s confirmation that the states match.
For good performance, DMON therefore requires a reliable
inter-monitor communication channel with minimal latency
and high bandwidth. There are many ways to realize such a
channel. We experimented with various designs of this com-
munication channel and implemented them in our RC-COM,
which exposes the inter-monitor communication API to our
monitors.
Network Protocol Choice. The most obvious protocol that
meets our reliability demands is TCP, which we used as the
basis for our first implementation of RC-COM. However, even
with extensive tweaking, our TCP-based implementation had
poor throughput and high latency. As an alternative, we there-
fore used ENet, a lightweight UDP-based protocol that also
offers reliable in-order and error-free data transfer [28]. Our
performance evaluation confirms that ENet is more efficient
than the TCP-based implementation that uses the standard
TCP/IP stack.
User-Space Networking. Besides the networking hard-
ware, the operating system also impacts the communication
bandwidth and latency. When a network adapter receives a
packet, for example, the OS first stores the packet in a kernel-
space buffer, before copying it into the receiving application’s
memory and transferring control to the application. These
extra copy operations can be avoided with techniques such as
Remote Direct Memory Access (RDMA). RDMA allows two
communicating peers to read or write directly from or to the
other peer’s application memory, thus bypassing the kernel’s
networking stack. We implemented an RDMA-based version
of our RC-COM using Mellanox ConnectX 100 gigabit eth-
ernet interfaces2 and the Mellanox Messaging Accelerator
user-space networking library3.
4.3 Optimizations
To improve DMON’s performance even further, we imple-
mented several optimizations that can reduce the number of
the data packets exchanged by our monitors.
Permissive Filesystem Access. Traditional NVX systems
enforce replication for all I/O operations, regardless of the
type of I/O resource being accessed. The system allows one
variant to effectively perform the operation and it then repli-
cates the results to the other variants. Even though this repli-
cation mechanism seamlessly provides identical inputs to all
variants, it is not always necessary in DMON’s case. Specifi-
cally, there is no need to replicate read accesses to files that
were identical on all physical machines when DMON started,
as long as the files have not been modified while DMON
was running. We refer to such files as static files and de-
signed DMON such that it can identify them. We also de-
signed the cross-checking handlers for read-only operations
such as sys_read, sys_readv, sys_pread, and sys_fstat
so that all variants may (optionally) read static files directly
from their local file system, thus bypassing the I/O replication
mechanism.
To support this optimization, DMON requires that the appli-
cation’s root directory has the same path name on all machines.
DMON further assumes that the all files except executables
and shared libraries in the application’s root- and subdirecto-
ries are identical when the system starts.
Asynchronous Cross-Checking. Our basic approach de-
scribed in Section 4 adds considerable overhead to every
system call invocation as every cross-check happens syn-
chronously and requires at least two network round-trips; one
for F-MONs to send the system call states of their supervised
variants to L-MON, and one for L-MON to instruct F-MONs
on how to proceed (abort or continue execution of the variant).
We developed a technique which we call asynchronous
cross-checking to reduce this overhead. Inspired by previ-
ous work [40, 67], the idea is to classify system calls into
three categories — highly sensitive, moderately sensitive, and
2https://store.mellanox.com/products/
mellanox-mcx515a-ccat-connectx-5-en-network-interface-card-100gbe-single-port-qsfp28-pcie3-0-x16-tall-bracket-rohs-r6.
html
3https://github.com/Mellanox/libvma/
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non-sensitive — based on the system call number and/or ar-
guments. With asynchronous cross-checking, highly sensitive
system calls still execute in lock-step, as before. When F-
MON deems a system call moderately sensitive, however, it
still sends the system call state information to L-MON, but
then immediately resumes execution of the supervised variant
without waiting for a reply from L-MON. L-MON eventually
receives the state information and may detect a divergence. In
that case, L-MON will instruct F-MONs to abort execution
through a separate error channel that is used only for this spe-
cific purpose. Non-sensitive system calls can execute without
any cross-checking at all.
Note that this policy differs from the selective cross-
checking described in previous work as DMON detects all di-
vergences for sensitive system calls including moderately sen-
sitive ones, whereas ReMon and MvArmor only detect diver-
gences on invocations of highly sensitive system calls [40,67].
There may, however, be a delay in the detection of divergent
invocations of moderately sensitive system calls.
Immutable State Caching. Many system calls, including
sys_getpid and sys_getppid, read immutable state such
as the process ID or thread ID. To avoid unnecessary cross-
checking and replication, DMON caches the results of the
first invocation of these system calls. DMON immediately
cancels any subsequent invocations of these calls and returns
the cached result instead. Note that, contrary to our other
optimizations, immutable state caching can not be disabled.
4.4 Reconciling Expected Divergences
In previous NVX systems, all program variants were com-
piled for the same target architecture and executed on a single
machine. DMON, by contrast, allows settings where vari-
ants target different ISAs/ABIs, and run on different physical
machines. The target ISA and ABI both affect a program’s
behavior as observed from the system call interface. ISA/ABI-
heterogeneity therefore challenges the core assumption that
variants will behave identically when provided with identical
inputs, as long as the inputs do not trigger a program bug nor
is the program being attacked.
We studied the ABI specification documents and analyzed
actual system call traces of both trivial and complex applica-
tions running on ARMv7, ARMv8, i386, and x86-64 CPUs
to understand and anticipate benign behavioral divergences
arising from ISA/ABI-heterogeneity. We incorporated our
findings into DMON’s design and summarize the different
classes of expected divergences and their causes in Table 1.
The first and foremost difference between the different
ABIs is that the system call numbers can (and often do)
differ between ABIs. The sys_read system call, for ex-
ample, has system call number 0 on x86-64 platforms and
on ARMv7 platforms that implement the old ARMv7 ABI
(i.e., arm-linux-gnu), 3 on i386 platforms, and 0x900003
     Divergences source        Affected system calls Action needed
SYSTEM CALL NUMBER
System call numbers differ 
between ABIs and/or 
identical code is translated 
to slightly different system 
calls.
SYSTEM CALL ARGUMENTS
Same code is translated to 
different system calls with 
similar functionality and 
diverse arguments.
STRUCT LAYOUT
Struct layout diversity 
caused from different ABIs.
FLAGS AND MODES
File flags and access modes 
used as system call 
arguments may be mapped 
to different integer values.
DMON keeps its own 
mapping that is 
aware of the 
ABIs/ISAs diversity.
DMON keeps its own 
"shadow" structs 
and deals with 
conversions. 
Transformation of 
system call metadata  
into platform-
independent state.
DMON keeps its own 
mapping that is 
aware of the 
ABIs/ISAs diversity. 
System calls that use integer 
arguments as file flags or access 
modes.
stat, fstat, fstatat, newfstatat, 
open, openat, rmdir, unlink, 
unlinkat, chown, fchownat, 
mkdir, mkdirat, pipe, pipe2, 
dup2, dup3, fork, clone, 
epoll_wait, epoll_pwait
System calls that use at least 
one argument that points to a 
struct.
Every system call
Table 1: Categories of expected divergences
on ARMv7 platforms that implement the new ARMv7 ABI
(i.e., arm-linux-gnueabi). DMON is aware of these differ-
ences and maps system call numbers to an internal platform-
independent identifier before comparing system call states.
System call arguments are not necessarily bit-for-bit identi-
cal across ABIs either, even when the arguments are in fact
the same. This is particularly true for C structs which may
be packed differently (i.e., there may be different numbers of
padding bytes between the struct fields) or have different sizes
depending on the ISA and ABI. To allow for bit-by-bit com-
parisons of such structs, DMON converts them to an internal
“shadow” type that is carefully specified and/or annotated so
it has the same layout on all platforms.
Except for trivial differences in system call numbers and
arguments, heterogeneous-ISA variants may use different sys-
tem calls altogether, because not all system calls are available
on all platforms. ARMv8 kernels, for example, do not imple-
ment the sys_open system call. ARMv8 variants therefore
always use sys_openat to open a file. sys_openat is simi-
lar to sys_open, but does have an additional argument that
can hold the file descriptor of a directory. If the pathname
argument of the sys_openat is relative, then it is interpreted
relative to the directory specified in the additional argument.
x86-64 kernels, on the other hand, implement both
sys_open and sys_openat and x86-64 variants regularly
use both APIs. Consequently, we may see divergences in
a setup where an ARMv8 and x86-64 variant try to open
the same files. DMON deals with these divergence by trans-
forming the system call states for similar system calls into
generic platform-independent states, prior to cross-checking.
In this concrete example, DMON would fully resolve the
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paths the variants are trying to access and then build system
call states corresponding with the invocation of a sys_openat
call, regardless of whether the variant called sys_open or
sys_openat.
Finally, there are several system calls that accept flags as
their arguments. These flags can specify file access modes,
file statuses, etc. The integer values assigned to these flags
may differ across ABIs. Consequently, cross-checking these
flag values may trigger false positive detections. Once again,
DMON deals with these divergences by mapping all flag
values to an internal platform-independent value prior to cross-
checking.
5 DMON Implementation
We implemented DMON for GNU/Linux. DMON runs na-
tively on the x86-64 and ARMv8 architectures and supports
variants compiled for these architectures. DMON also has
partial support for ARMv7 and i386.
System Call Support and Classification. DMON cur-
rently has cross-checking and replication support for 93 sys-
tem calls. Table 2 shows an overview of these calls, and how
DMON cross-checks and replicates them. The type of cross-
checking depends on the security-sensitivity of the call (see
Section 4.3). DMON always cross-checks highly sensitive
system calls in lock-step. Moderately sensitive calls are either
checked asynchronously, if the asynchronous cross-checking
optimization is enabled, or in lock-step if the optimization is
disabled. None-sensitive calls are not checked at all.
The type of replication depends on the kind of results the
system call returns. DMON enforces replication for all I/O
operations that are not reads from static files (see Section 4.3),
and for all system calls that return mutable program state.
Read operations from static files execute without replication
if the permissive filesystem access optimization is enabled.
System calls that must be executed by all variants and system
calls that read cached immutable program state are not subject
to any replication.
Support Infrastructure. Aside from the core components
described in the previous section, DMON comes with two
support components. NVX-DAEMON is a standalone service
that needs to be installed as a Unix daemon. NVX-DAEMON
acts on service requests from our second component, the
APP-STARTER. Depending on the type of service request,
NVX-DAEMON either launches a new monitor and one or
more variants, or shuts down a running monitor and its vari-
ants. The APP-STARTER component reads a configuration
file written by the system administrator and then sends the
appropriate service requests to the NVX-DAEMON compo-
nents. The configuration file contains information on which
variants to start or shut down (e.g., their architectures, path
Cross-Checking
Always
Lock-Step
Possibly 
Asynchronous
Replication
None
lseek, stat, fstat, fstatat, 
newfstatat, open, 
openat, dup, dup2, 
dup3, close, fcntl, ioctl,  
read, readv, pread64 
 
fork, clone, socket, bind, 
listen,  connect, accept4, 
accept, socket, 
socketpair, 
rt_sigprocmask, 
rt_sigaction, 
rt_sigsuspend, eventfd2, 
epoll_create, 
epoll_create1, chown, 
fchownat, pipe, pipe2
write, writev, pwrite64,  
send, sendto, sendfile, 
epoll_ctl,
setsockopt, shutdown, 
epoll_wait, epoll_pwait, 
clock_gettime, 
gettimeofday, sysinfo,
recvfrom, getsockname, 
getpeername, 
getsockopt
getpid, getppid, futex, 
sched_yield, nanosleep, 
gettid, getgid, getegid, 
getuid, geteuid, 
arch_prctl, prlimit64,
getpriority, madvise, 
sched_getaffinity,   
set_tid_address, getpgrp
getcwd, mkdir, mkdirat, 
rmdir, unlink, unlinkat, 
sync, fsync
Possibly Never
execve, mprotect, 
mmap, munmap, brk, 
exit_group, setuid, 
setgid, setsid, chdir, 
umask, prctl, chown, 
fchownat
Table 2: Supported system calls and their classification
names, command line arguments, etc.), and which machines
the variants should run on.
Virtual System Calls. On most architectures, Linux loads a
Virtual Dynamic Shared Object (VDSO) or vsyscall page
into the address spaces of all user-space programs. These
executable code pages expose a number of so-called virtual
system calls, which allow the program to execute certain sys-
tem calls (e.g., sys_gettimeofday) without mode switching
into kernel space. Most NVX systems either hide, replace, or
disable the VDSO and vsyscall page because virtual system
calls are invisible to the monitor, and therefore bypass the
replication mechanism. For our prototype, we patched the C
library our variants link against so that the library never uses
virtual system calls. Operations such as gettimeofday are
therefore always visible to our monitors.
6 Limitations
Asynchronous Signals. Asynchronous signals are cur-
rently not supported in our implementation. Our monitors
discard any asynchronous signals that the variants might re-
ceive. This not a fundamental limitation of our approach but a
matter of additional engineering effort. Signal handling mech-
anisms would be implemented as has already been described
in earlier work [33, 53].
Multithreading. DMON has only partial support for multi-
threaded variants. Running multithreaded variants currently
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may trigger divergences and false positive detections. Earlier
work describes techniques to support variants in which the
threads do not communicate directly [33, 40, 45, 69]. These
techniques can directly be incorporated into our prototype.
Supporting variants in which the threads do communicate
directly is more difficult. The current state-of-the-art is to
capture the order in which the leader variant executes thread
synchronization instructions, and to replay this order in the
follower variants [66]. Incorporating this mechanism into our
prototype would require substantial engineering effort.
Address-Dependent Behavior. Similarly, there might be
divergences in programs featuring address-dependent behav-
ior. If a program inserts objects into a binary tree based on
their memory addresses, and subsequently prints out that tree,
the output would likely differ across variants. Earlier work
describes several similar cases [68]. We are not aware of
any automated solutions for identifying and neutralizing such
address-dependent computations, so this is currently an open
problem that applies to all NVX systems.
7 Security Analysis
Scope. NVX systems can prevent the attacker from using
absolute code addresses in an exploit payload by adopting
a technique called Address Space Partitioning (ASP) [14,
45, 65]. With ASP, the NVX system lays out the variants’
address spaces in such a way that (i) the base addresses of
executable code regions are randomly chosen, and (ii) no
absolute memory address ever points to valid code in more
than one variant. We refer the reader to earlier work for a
detailed security analysis of this technique [14, 45, 65], and
focus on evaluating the additional security DMON can pro-
vide through ISA/ABI-heterogeneity. Specifically, we show
the extent to which ISA/ABI-heterogeneity prevents concrete
code-reuse and data-only attacks that cannot be easily stopped
using existing NVX systems.
Analysis Targets and Configurations. We used four pop-
ular server applications — Nginx 1.14.2, Lighttpd 1.4.52,
Redis 5.0.1, and ProFTPD 1.3.0 — as our analysis targets,
which is in line with previous work on security-oriented NVX
systems [40,45,67,69]. We evaluated the security of a hetero-
geneous configuration with one program variant compiled for
Intel x86-64 and one for ARMv7.
7.1 Code Layout Diversity
Existing NVX systems that deploy ASP can be bypassed us-
ing attacks that rely on partial overwrites of code pointers
such as return addresses or function pointers [17, 27]. The
basic idea is to force the program to produce a (number of)
legal code pointer(s) at memory locations that the attacker can
overwrite. The attacker then overwrites the least significant
bits or adds arbitrary offsets to each of these code pointers,
and thereby diverts the execution of the program to a series
of attacker-chosen gadgets (i.e., instruction sequences ending
with indirect branches, such as return instructions). In the
PIROP attack, for example, Goktas et al. exploited a vulnera-
bility in the Asterisk communication server that allowed them
to produce legal return addresses at an attacker-controlled
position on the stack [27]. They then overwrote the least
significant byte of each of these return addresses to build a
so-called PIROP gadget chain, which they then invoked by
exploiting another vulnerability.
The reason why these attacks bypass existing NVX systems
is because they do not require any information leakage (which
the NVX system would detect), and because the same partial
pointer overwrites can achieve the same results in each variant.
In this section, we show that DMON makes these position-
independent code-reuse attacks far more challenging because
ISA/ABI-heterogeneity substantially reduces the number of
position-independent gadgets available to the attacker.
Position-Independent Gadget Availability. Position-
independent gadgets are instruction sequences that can be
reliably invoked by patching legal code pointers. We consider
two ways to patch legal code pointers. First, an attacker
could overwrite an offset variable that is later added to a
code pointer in a pointer arithmetic operation. This primitive
allows attackers to reliably invoke any gadget, as long as the
internal layout of the target binary is known.
Second, the attacker could overwrite the least significant
bits of a code pointer directly using a memory write vulnera-
bility. This primitive is far less potent than the former, as it
allows the attacker to overwrite only the 8 least significant
bits (i.e., one byte). Overwriting more than one byte is not
possible unless the attacker knows the base address of the
target binary because the ASP scheme randomizes all but the
12 least significant bits of each base address.
We compiled a list of the position-independent gadgets in
both our x86-64 and ARMv7 binaries as follows. We first
collected the addresses of (i) all instructions that immediately
follow call instructions, and (ii) all address-taken functions
in the program. The former is an approximation of the set
of legal return addresses that could exist in the program’s
address space at any given point during its execution. The
latter is the set of other code pointers that could be found in
the program’s memory. Combined, this list approximates the
set of pointers that could potentially be patched by attackers
to construct position-independent code-reuse payloads.
We then used Ropper to generate lists of regular ROP gad-
gets consisting of 15 instructions or less [54]. This, again, is
consistent with related work [27].
Next, we combined the two lists for each binary as follows.
For every code pointer in the first list, we calculated the (i)
addresses of all gadgets relative to the pointer, and (ii) absolute
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Table 3: Subroutine calling conventions for x86-64 and
ARMv7.
arch/ABI arg1 arg2 arg3 arg4 arg5 arg6 arg7 result
x86-64 rdi rsi rdx rcx r8 r9 - rax
arm/EABI r0 r1 r2 r3 stack stack stack r0-r3
Table 4: System call calling conventions for x86-64 and
ARMv7.
arch/ABI syscall # arg1 arg2 arg3 arg4 arg5 arg6 arg7 result
x86-64 rax rdi rsi rdx r10 r8 r9 - rax
arm/EABI r7 r0 r1 r2 r3 r4 r5 r6 r0
addresses of gadgets that only differ from the code pointer in
their 8 least significant bits. The former is the set of gadgets
reachable through offset overwrites, while the latter is the set
of gadgets reachable through partial pointer overwrites.
Next we correlated the position-independent gadgets found
for the x86-64 binary with those found for ARMv7. For each
x86-64 gadget, we checked whether there is an ARMv7 gad-
get that can be reached using the same offset overwrite/partial
pointer overwrite. We then eliminated gadgets whose absolute
address or offset from the source code pointer is not 4-byte
aligned, since code pointers patched in either way would be
unaligned on ARMv7 and would trigger an unaligned instruc-
tion exception when the gadget is invoked.
We collected 2553 code pointers from Nginx, 1988 code
pointers from Lighttpd, 1732 code pointers from Redis, and
4514 code pointers from ProFTPD. Figure 3 shows how many
gadgets can be reached on average from each code pointer
by offset overwrite and partial pointer overwrite attacks. In a
traditional NVX system where all variants are compiled for
Intel x86-64, all of the gadgets identified in the x86-64 binary
would survive. In contrast, in all four of our target programs,
and for both code pointer patching strategies, less than 3.3%
of the gadgets survive in an NVX configuration with a x86-64
variant and an ARMv7 variant.
Position-Independent Gadget Semantics. The final step
of an exploit is often to call a security-sensitive function or a
system call with attacker-specified arguments (e.g., execve
with the /bin/sh string as the first argument to spawn a
shell). The ABI-heterogeneity provided by DMON imposes
another constraint on chaining gadgets to build such an ex-
ploit. Because different architectures have different calling
conventions for system calls and subroutines, as shown in
Table 3 and Table 4, the attacker should chain a sequence
of gadgets that prepare the same set of arguments, but in a
different way for each architecture.
For example, in an ARMv7 variant, the attacker must use
r7 to prepare a system call number, whereas in a x86-64 vari-
ant the same attacker must use rax. To show the difficulty of
constructing a code-reuse attack that performs one or more
system calls and/or subroutine calls, we analyzed the seman-
tics of position-independent gadgets surviving under DMON.
Specifically, we looked for gadgets that read a value from
memory and write that value into the system call number reg-
ister, or the registers for one of the first three arguments of a
system or function call. As shown in Figure 3, only a small
fraction of the position-independent gadgets have suitable
semantics for argument preparation (see 3rd to 6th bars in
the figure). More interestingly, system call number prepara-
tion gadgets are rare compared to other argument preparation
gadgets. In a standalone ARMv7 binary of Nginx, Redis, and
ProFTPD, we could not find a single partial-pointer-overwrite
based position-independent gadget which can load a system
call number. Obviously then, we also could not find such
gadgets among those that survive across architectures.
7.2 Data Layout Diversity
Aside from protecting against code-reuse attacks, DMON also
raises the bar for successful data-only attacks. In a data-only
attack, the adversary forces the program to disclose sensi-
tive information such as pointer values, corrupt sensitive data
such as stored user credentials, or perform arbitrary computa-
tions [35,37], without deviating from its intended control-flow
paths.
Prior work showed that NVX systems may be able to stop
certain data-only attacks. First, the system can extend ASP to
data regions to prevent the variants from disclosing absolute
pointer values to remote attackers [40, 45]. Next, the system
can run variants with opposing stack growth directions to
thwart attacks that corrupt sensitive stack variables [53]. Fi-
nally, the variants can use randomizing heap allocators to prob-
abilistically stop data-only attacks that corrupt heap data [4].
All of these defenses provide diversity at page- or object-
level granularity. As such, they cannot prevent intra-object
overread or overwrite attacks, in which a pointer to a spe-
cific field in a data structure is used to disclose or overwrite
a different field within that same structure [23]. DMON, in
contrast, naturally provides intra-object diversity. Due to dif-
ferences in sizes of pointers and primitive data types, as well
as differences in struct packing and alignment, data structures
rarely have the same sizes and layouts across architectures
and ABIs.
Previous NVX systems could achieve intra-object diversity
by artificially reorganizing structures at compile time (e.g.,
by reordering struct fields or inserting padding between the
fields). However, only a limited number of structs can be
compile-time diversified in practice. Specifically, it is not safe
to diversify i) structures used as arguments or return types
of external library functions, ii) structures with an initializa-
tion list, iii) structs cast to different types, etc. [12, 44]. We
examined struct layouts in a set of Nginx binaries to show
how much structure layout diversity DMON can naturally
achieve, compared to the number of structures that can be
compile-time diversified by existing type-based structure lay-
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Figure 3: The average number of position-independent code-reuse gadgets available from each code pointer for each pointer
patching strategy.
out randomization techniques [12,44]. We found that existing
compile-time techniques could only diversify 50 out of 453
structures, whereas 422 out of 453 structures inherently have
different layouts on ARMv7 and x86-64.
ProFTPD SSL Private Key Leak. Hu et al. demonstrated
an information disclosure attack on ProFTPD, in which the
attacker locates a base pointer to an SSL context data structure,
and then uses Data-Oriented Programming (DOP) gadgets
to traverse through the context and 6 other data structures,
ultimately reaching a private key, which is then leaked to a
remote attacker [35]. DMON can prevent this attack because
the layouts of the 6 data structures differs across architectures.
We examined the relevant data structures in ARMv7 and x86-
64 binaries of ProFTPD and found that 4 of the 6 pointer
fields that need to be dereferenced in this attack are located
at different offsets in the two binaries. A DOP exploit that
traverses through the structs therefore cannot simultaneously
reach and leak the private key on both platforms without
triggering an alarm in DMON.
8 Performance Evaluation
We conducted an extensive performance evaluation of DMON
using handwritten microbenchmarks (Section 8.1), as well as
popular high-performance server applications (Section 8.2).
We ran our benchmarks under two different configurations:
The low-end configuration had an ARMv8 variant run-
ning on a Raspberry Pi 3 Model B board with a quad-core
1.2GHz Broadcom BCM2837 64-bit CPU and 1GB of RAM,
running the 64-bit ARM Debian 9 distribution of GNU/Linux,
as well as an x86-64 variant running on a desktop machine
with a quad-core Intel i5-6500 CPU and 16GB of RAM, run-
ning the x86-64 version of Ubuntu 16.04.5 LTS. The ma-
chines were connected through a private 100 megabit ethernet
connection with approximately 0.5ms latency.
The high-end configuration had an x86-64 variant run-
ning on a desktop machine with an octa-core Intel i9-9900K
CPU and 32GB of RAM, and an x86-64 variant running on
a machine with a quad-core Intel i5-6500 CPU and 16GB
of RAM. Both machines ran the x86-64 version of Ubuntu
16.04.5 LTS and were connected using a private 100 gigabit
connection between two Mellanox ConnectX ethernet inter-
face cards. These RDMA-capable cards support the Mellanox
Messaging Accelerator, a user-space networking library with
TCP support and sub-microsecond latency.
In both configurations, we ran the leader variant on the
slower machine. This choice minimizes the time the leader
variant has to wait in its cross-checking handlers for the fol-
lower variant to send the system call state information (see
Section 4).
We evaluated two implementations of our RC-COM compo-
nent (see Section 4.2) for the low-end configuration. The first
implementation, which appears as KTCP (short for kernel-
space TCP) in the graphs, uses the standard Linux TCP/IP
stack. The second implementation uses the ENet protocol.
For the high-end configuration, we additionally evaluated
an implementation that leverages the Mellanox Messaging
Accelerator library. This implementation appears as UTCP
(short for user-space TCP) in the graphs. We could not test
this UTCP implementation for configuration 1 as we could
not find the appropriate hardware for our ARMv8 board.
We also evaluated the impact of our replication and cross-
checking optimizations described in Section 4.3. Our Asyn-
chronous Cross-Checking optimization appears as ACC in
the graphs, whereas our Permissive Filesystem Access opti-
mization appears as PFA.
8.1 Microbenchmarks
To measure the overhead introduced by DMON, we designed
microbenchmarks to test different combinations of cross-
checking and replication strategies (see Section 5). The mi-
crobenchmarks are small programs that execute the same
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Figure 4: Microbenchmarks for high-end configuration.
system call one million times in a loop.
We used the following system calls:
1. sys_read(STATIC_FILE_FD, buf, 512) reads 512
bytes from a static file. DMON treats sys_read as
a moderately sensitive system call. As such, this mi-
crobenchmark benefits from our asynchronous cross-
checking optimization (see Section 4.3). Since the file
we are reading is static, DMON also skips replication
if the permissive file system access optimization is en-
abled.
2. sys_getcwd(buf, 512) retrieves the pathname for the cur-
rent working directory The results of this system call do
not need to be replicated, as long as the current working
directory is either the application’s root directory, or one
of its subdirectories (see Section 4.3).
3. sys_sched_yield() relinquishes the CPU and moves the
calling process to the end of the scheduling queue.
DMON does not perform cross-checking or replication
for this system call.
To understand the performance impact of cross-process
monitoring in a distributed setting, we also implemented a
rudimentary distributed in-process monitoring mechanism,
similar to the one used in VARAN [33]. With this in-process
monitoring mechanism, the variants run in the same ad-
dress space as their monitors and invoke the monitor’s cross-
checking and replication handlers directly, rather than indi-
rectly through the ptrace API.
For each microbenchmark, we measured the execution time
under DMON’s high-end configuration relative to the native
(standalone) execution time on the slowest machine. Figure 4
shows the mathematical average of the run time for three runs
of each benchmark, relative to the native execution time. We
used our UTCP implementation of RC-COM for all exper-
iments, but did run separate tests with and without our per-
missive file access (PFA) and asynchronous cross-checking
(ACC) optimizations. We then repeated the experiments with
the in-process monitoring mechanism (marked as DIMSM in
the graph).
The results show that most of the overhead can be at-
tributed to two sources: the network communication of our
replication and cross-checking mechanisms, and the con-
text switching caused by ptrace. PFA reduces the overhead
of our read benchmark from 28x to 22x, but does not af-
fect the getcwd and sched_yield benchmarks. This is un-
surprising since read is the only of the three system calls
that accesses static files. ACC further decreases overhead of
read and getcwd, from 22x to 15x and from 38x to 33x re-
spectively. sched_yield’s performance is unaffected, since
DMON does not perform any cross-checking for this system
call.
The rightmost columns in the graph indicate that the con-
text switching overhead of ptrace is by far the biggest con-
tributor to DMON’s overhead. Overhead is reduced from 15x
to 1.51x for read and from 33x to 1.58x for getcwd. For
sched_yield, there is no observable overhead.
8.2 Server Benchmarks
We evaluated DMON on 3 popular server applications — Ng-
inx 1.14.2, Lighttpd 1.4.52 and Redis 5.0.1 — that were also
used to evaluate prior work [33, 40, 45, 67]. For each of our
experiments, we connected a benchmarking client to the ma-
chine that runs the leader variant through a 100 megabit ether-
net connection (for our low-end configuration) or a 1 gigabit
ethernet connection (for the high-end configuration). Figure 5
shows our results.
We used the wrk client to measure the throughput and
latency for Nginx and Lighttpd, and the redis-benchmark
utility to evaluate Redis. We configured wrk to repeatedly
request the same static 4KB web page for 10 seconds using 10
parallel connections, and redis-benchmark to simulate 50
clients issuing 100000 requests in total. Completing 100000
requests takes under a minute when running redis natively
on a modern x86 machine. Running the same benchmarks
under DMON’s slowest configurations would take over a day,
however, so we decided to not run the benchmarks at all, and
to simply mark the corresponding bars as N/A in the graphs.
We simulated two scenarios for each of our configurations.
In Scenarios 1 and 3, we used the network link between
the benchmark client machine and the machine that runs the
leader variant as-is. This meant that the latency on the 100
megabit link was just under 0.5ms, whereas the latency on the
1 gigabit link was under 0.1ms. The benchmarking client was
able to fully saturate the leader variant’s machine in both cases.
With all of DMON’s optimizations enabled, the performance
overheads ranged between 7.03x and 21.71x for the low-end
configuration, and between 4.52x and 6.65x for the high-end
configuration.
In Scenarios 2 and 4, we used the Linux Traffic Con-
trol tool (tc) and the netem driver to artificially increase
the latency on the benchmarking client’s connection to 2ms,
thereby simulating the experimental setups used in prior
work [14, 46, 67]. In these scenarios, our benchmarking client
could not fully saturate the leader variant’s machine. With
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Figure 5: Server benchmarks in two configurations, with two scenarios per configuration.
all of DMON’s optimizations enabled, the performance over-
heads ranged between 7.23x and 10.13x for the low-end con-
figuration, and between 1.0x and 1.51x for the high-end con-
figuration.
We observed two general trends in our results. First, our RC-
COM implementation that uses the standard Linux TCP/IP
stack (shown as KTCP in the graphs) is substantially slower
than both of the alternative implementations. Second, the web
server applications benefit greatly from our permissive filesys-
tem access (PFA) and asynchronous cross-checking (ACC)
optimizations. In scenario 3, for example, PFA decreased the
overhead of Lighttpd from 23692.60x to 6131.33x with the
KTCP-based RC-COM, whereas ACC decreased the over-
head from 23692.60x to 8317.97x. For Redis, the effect of
enabling these optimizations is negligible. This makes sense,
because Redis is an in-memory data structure store that rarely
accesses the filesystem.
8.3 Comparison With Other NVX Systems
Our server benchmarks show that DMON can incur sub-
stantial performance overheads on saturated machines, even
when using the User-Space TCP-based implementation of
our RC-COM component and both of our cross-checking
and replication optimizations. Intuitively, one might think
that the inter-monitor communication overhead is to blame.
That is not the case, however, as prior work showed nearly
identical overheads for a traditional single-host NVX sys-
tem. Specifically, GHUMVEE was tested on the same server
applications (albeit slightly older versions), and in highly sim-
ilar circumstances, with a 1 gigabit link that had less than
0.1ms of latency. GHUMVEE’s overhead on Lighttpd was
7.0x on a saturated server (vs 5.43x for DMON), and 12.48x
for Redis (vs 6.65x for DMON) [67]. Handing the monitor-
ing of non-sensitive system calls over from the ptrace-based
GHUMVEE to the in-process monitor IP-MON brought down
the overhead to 2.69x and 1.45x for Lighttpd and Redis resp.
DMON could likely achieve even better performance if we
added full in-process monitoring, because DMON supports
asynchronous cross-checking of moderately sensitive system
calls and permissive filesystem access for static content.
9 Discussion
Asymmetrical Attacks. The heterogeneity present in the
code and data layout can still, in theory, be bypassed by attack-
ers. For example, an attacker can perform a set of malicious
operations, which is functional in one variant, but interpreted
as no-operation in the other. By combining two sets of such
operations in an attack (each set only functional for each vari-
ant), the attacker can perform the same malicious operation
in all variants, evading DMON’s detection.
For example, in a PIROP attack, the attacker can find gad-
gets that are only functional in one variant, and interpreted
as no-operation in the other, and chain them together. An
attacker can also adopt a similar strategy to construct certain
data-only attacks. In a privilege escalation attack, for exam-
ple, the attacker can tolerate the difference in the layout of
a structure by overwriting a security sensitive field at both
offsets in all variants, even when each offset is valid only for
a single variant. This results in an unintended corruption of
variables in all variants. As long as such corruption does not
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trigger an observable divergence, however, the attacker can
bypass DMON.
Leveraging Hardware Features. A potential advantage of
running variants on different architectures is that the NVX
system could leverage hardware security features available on
one platform to protect software running on other platforms.
A future revision of the ARMv8 architecture (ARMv8.5-A),
for example, will include a feature called Memory Tagging.
This feature allows the program to add tags to every pointer
and every memory allocation. When the program derefer-
ences a pointer, the CPU automatically checks if the pointer
tag matches the allocation tag. Memory tagging, if properly
implemented, can detect both spatial and temporal memory
errors. A hypothetical configuration in which DMON runs
one variant on an ARMv8.5-A CPU and one variant on an
Intel x86-64 CPU could be used to bring the benefits of mem-
ory tagging to Intel x86-64 software. In a similar manner,
DMON could enable Intel’s Control-flow Enforcement Tech-
nology (CET) for ARM programs, and ARMv8.3’s pointer
authentication for Intel x86-64 programs.
Micro-Architectural Attacks. While our primary focus
was on defending against memory exploits, we believe
DMON might also be able to stop certain micro-architectural
attacks. Rowhammer attacks in particular would become ex-
ceedingly hard to launch against DMON [31,55,63]. Rowham-
mer attacks induce bit flips in so-called weak DRAM cells
by rapidly and repeatedly accessing adjacent DRAM rows.
To build reliable Rowhammer attacks, the attacker needs to
know exactly how the memory controller translates physical
memory addresses into DRAM addresses [50, 61]. Transla-
tion schemes differ greatly across platforms, however, which
makes Rowhammer attack payloads non-portable. Moreover,
even if two machines did have memory controllers using the
same translation scheme, Rowhammer attacks would still fail
with high probability under DMON, as the positions of the
weak cells tend to differ for any given pair of DRAM modules.
10 Related Work
N-Variant eXecution. The idea of running diversified soft-
ware variants in parallel for increased security is not new.
Inspired by Chen and Avizienis’ seminal work on N-Version
Programming [2, 10], Berger and Zorn proposed a system for
probabilistic memory safety that could run simultaneously
execute identical variants with differently seeded randomizing
memory allocators [4]. This system only supported applica-
tions that received input through stdin and that wrote output
to stdout, however. Cox et al.’s N-Variant Systems moni-
tored a much wider array of system calls and replicated I/O
from various sources, thus supporting variants of non-trivial
applications such as the Apache web server [14]. Subsequent
publications explored consistent delivery of asynchronous
signals [6, 53], dealing with shared memory [6], thread syn-
chronization [66], or address-dependent behavior [68], and
new schemes for generating software variants [40, 45, 65, 69].
Other researchers suggested to use NVX systems for live
patch testing [32,33,39,41,46,51]. Contrary to DMON, how-
ever, all of these systems require that the variants are compiled
for the same architecture, and run on the same host.
Pina et al. proposed a Domain-Specific Language to spec-
ify expected divergences between different variants, and an
NVX system that reconciles divergent variants [52]. Here,
the assumption is that the variants have minor differences
because they were not compiled from the same revision of the
source code. DMON assumes that the variants were compiled
from the same source code, but it does reconcile variants that
diverge because of ISA and ABI-heterogeneity.
Heterogeneous-ISA Migration. Several researchers ex-
plored the idea of heterogeneous-ISA program migration. De-
vuyst et al. demonstrated performance and energy efficiency
increases by migrating the execution of a program between
the cores of a heterogeneous-ISA CPU [16]. Venkat et al. later
showed that heterogeneous-ISA migration has potential se-
curity benefits [64]. These systems require specialized CPUs
that are not widely available, whereas DMON was designed
to run on commodity hardware.
11 Conclusion
We presented DMON, a novel, distributed N-Variant Execu-
tion system that leverages diversity in instruction set archi-
tectures and application binary interfaces to protect against
memory corruption attacks. To bypass DMON, attackers must
provide exploits that simultaneously work on two or more
different platforms. We analyzed binaries for two completely
different platforms, one for x86-64 and one for ARMv7 (32-
bit). Our analysis shows that DMON can be an effective
mitigation for position-independent code-reuse attacks which
bypass traditional NVX systems. For security-critical server
applications, only 1-3% of position-independent code-reuse
gadgets survived on both platforms. Furthermore, our case
study shows that DMON can raise the bar for successful data-
only attacks when the variants have different data-layouts
due to differences in their data type sizes, struct packing and
alignment rules, etc.
Unlike previous NVX systems which run on a single ma-
chine, network communications between the monitors on
different machines become a new source of performance over-
head for DMON. We introduce new optimizations to mini-
mize network round-trips: permissive filesystem access, asyn-
chronous cross-checking, and immutable state caching. Our
performance evaluation shows that these optimizations, com-
bined with an optimized network protocol, greatly reduces
the performance overhead (from thousands times to single
digit percentages in realistic scenarios) without sacrificing
DMON’s security guarantees.
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